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On Wednesday, December 28, 2011, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in Hagan v. California Physicians' Service dba Blue Shield of California, et al, Case No. A130809 (unpublished), a health insurance rescission matter.

The matter was handled by Barger & Wolen Senior Partners John M. LeBlanc and Sandra Weishart, Senior Associates Ophir Johna and Vivian Orlando, and Greg Pimstone of Manatt, Phelps and Phillips. 

Background

In 2005, the Hagan family applied for health coverage with Blue Shield of California Life & Health Insurance Company. Beginning in 2001, Lori Hagan -- in her mid-thirties -- began to experience heavy menstrual cramping and bleeding. Over the next four years, she saw at least four physicians who diagnosed her with an enlarged uterus, fibroid tumors, menorrhagia and dysmenorrhea. She underwent exploratory laparoscopic surgery under general anesthesia, which confirmed the fibroid tumors and also revealed uterine adhesions and endometrial tissue. Ms. Hagan also underwent hormone therapy to treat the bleeding and severe pain. She was advised on multiple occasions that she needed to consider a hysterectomy or uterine ablation as treatment options.  

In applying for insurance coverage, however, the Hagans failed to disclose any of this information, despite application questions that asked the applicants to disclose any treatment, advice or symptoms concerning the female reproductive system, such as abnormal bleeding or fibroids, questions that inquired about any visits to the hospital, outpatient center, surgeries, and questions that requested disclosure of any other symptoms, conditions or recommended treatment not mentioned elsewhere on the application. 

In response to the application question that asked the applicants to disclose their last physician visit, Ms. Hagan failed to disclose that she had seen her physician just three weeks earlier, where he had again diagnosed her with painful symptoms related to her fibroids and where they again discussed hysterectomy as an option. 

Blue Shield Life rescinded the policy after it discovered these misrepresentations and omissions.

Though not required, Blue Shield Life paid all of the medical expenses incurred by the Hagans through the date of the rescission. The Hagans obtained replacement coverage within a few days, and Ms. Hagan was not deprived of any medical treatment as a result of the rescission.

Unfortunately, Ms. Hagan later passed away from uterine cancer. John Hagan sued Blue Shield Life alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and punitive damages. 

The Court's Decision

In upholding the trial court's decision granting summary judgment, the Court of Appeal first reviewed general principles governing an insurer's right to rescind. It rejected Hagan's argument that the language of Blue Shield Life's policy required it to prove that the Hagans' misrepresentations were intentional. 

The Court then reviewed the undisputed evidence in detail, in light of the specific questions on the application, as well as the excuses proffered by Hagan for why Ms. Hagan failed to disclose her long medical history, and concluded that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in Blue Shield Life's favor, in that there were clear misrepresentations and omissions of material facts on the application. 

The Court also found that Blue Shield Life did not engage in postclaims underwriting as defined in California Insurance Code section 10384. 

The Court held that the case was governed by the legal standards concerning underwriting and rescission set forth in Nieto v. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Insurance Company, 181 Cal. App. 4th 60 (2010) (click here for list of prior posts on Nieto). 

According to the Court, Blue Shield Life can only be guilty of postclaims underwriting if the "written information submitted on or with" the Hagans' application gave rise to "reasonable questions" that Blue Shield Life failed to resolve prior to issuing the policy. 

Against the background of California law that entitles Blue Shield Life to rely on the accuracy of the information the Hagans provided on their application (i.e., Blue Shield Life was not required to assume any of the Hagans' statements were false), Blue Shield Life properly completed its medical underwriting, and therefore did not violate Insurance Code section 10384.

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Roth v. Madison National Life Ins. Co., 702 F.Supp.2d 1174 (C.D. Cal 2010)

Facts and holding: Paul Roth (“Roth”) was insured under two life insurance policies issued by Madison National Life Insurance Company (“Madison”). Both policies contained a “Critical Illness Benefit Rider” which provided that 10% of the policies’ death benefits would be advanced in the event the insured underwent an angioplasty procedure and certain conditions were met. One of those conditions was that the insured furnish Madison with evidence of significant electrocardiographic (“EKG”) changes.

In July 2004, Roth received an angioplasty and submitted a claim to Madison for benefits. In evaluating Roth’s claim, Madison obtained Roth’s medical records relating to the angioplasty procedure. Those records revealed that prior to the angioplasty, Roth underwent an EKG, the results of which were normal. As a result, Madison denied Roth’s claim. Thereafter, Roth sued Madison for breach of contract and bad faith.

Madison brought a motion for partial summary judgment on Roth’s bad faith claim, arguing that it could not be liable for bad faith because, in denying Roth’s claim, it had simply complied with the express terms of the riders. Roth conceded that he did not provide Madison with evidence of significant EKG changes, but argued that the terms of the riders were outdated and should be disregarded because his physician concluded that the angioplasty was medically necessary.

The Court ruled that a claim for bad faith fails where the alleged bad faith conduct is specifically permitted by the policy. Put another way, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot contradict the express terms of a contract. Since Madison had specifically relied on the terms of the contract as a precondition to paying benefits (in requiring Roth to submit evidence of EKG changes), that insistence could not be considered bad faith conduct.

Lessons Learned: The principle the Roth Court articulated is an offshoot of the more well-known and long-standing principle in California that although there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract, it will only be recognized to further the contract’s purpose. It naturally follows that the implied covenant cannot serve as a basis for prohibiting a party to do that which is expressly permitted by that contract (the policy).

(The author was counsel for Madison in the above dispute.)

From A Smorgasbord of Interesting Disability Cases.

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Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. DiBari, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122906 (D. Conn. 2010)

Facts and holding: On April 29, 2008, dentist Michael DiBari (“DiBari”) submitted a claim for total disability benefits under his disability income and business overhead expense coverage (“BOE”) policies with Paul Revere Life Insurance Company (“Paul Revere”) as a result of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.

Paul Revere ultimately denied DiBari’s claim because after conservative treatment failed to alleviate his symptoms, DiBari declined to undergo carpal tunnel release surgery. Although DiBari’s treating physician believed there was a risk that the surgery might not be successful, he and DiBari’s neurologist both agreed that DiBari did not have any contraindications to the surgery and that the surgery was not “medically inappropriate.” Additionally, Paul Revere’s in-house board certified orthopedic surgeon and an independent hand surgeon both agreed that by failing to undergo release surgery, DiBari was not seeking and receiving “appropriate care” for his symptoms. 

In order to be eligible to receive total disability benefits under the policies DiBari was required to be “receiving Physician’s Care,” among other things. Both policies defined “Physician’s Care” as

the regular and personal care of a Physician which, under prevailing medical standards, is appropriate for the condition causing the disability.” (Emphasis added.)

Paul Revere interpreted this language to mean that DiBari must obtain “appropriate care” for his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.

Paul Revere brought a complaint for declaratory relief and moved for summary judgment on the grounds that by refusing the release surgery, DiBari was not receiving “appropriate care” and was thus ineligible to receive disability benefits. DiBari interpreted the same policy language to require only that he receive “regular and personal care,” which he argued did not include surgery.

The Court agreed with Paul Revere’s interpretation of the policy language, holding that the policy obligated DiBari to do more than receive “regular care”; he was required to seek and accept appropriate medical care for his condition. It was undisputed that conservative treatment failed to alleviate DiBari’s symptoms and his treating physicians agreed that release surgery did not pose any risk to DiBari, and was not medically inappropriate. Accordingly, Paul Revere was entitled to summary judgment on its complaint for declaratory relief.

Lessons Learned: In reaching its decision, the Court relied in part on the Northern District of California’s decision in Buck v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22479 (N.D. Cal. 2010), a case which the author included in last year’s Cornucopia presentation. The Buck case also dealt with the issue of an insured’s duty to undergo carpal tunnel surgery under the “appropriate care” provisions of the disability policy at issue. The policy language at issue in Buck was similar to the disputed policy language in the present case, requiring the insured to be “receiving medical care from someone other than himself which is appropriate for the injury or sickness.” The Buck Court held that this language obligated a claimant to receive “appropriate care.” However, the Buck Court declined to grant a summary judgment motion on the issue of whether the insured’s failure to undergo carpal tunnel surgery equated with a failure to receive appropriate care because, in that case, there were conflicting opinions as to whether surgery was appropriate treatment for Buck. 

In the present case, there were no conflicting opinions concerning whether surgery would be appropriate for DiBari. The undisputed facts demonstrated that conservative treatment failed to alleviate DiBari’s carpal tunnel symptoms and that DiBari’s physicians believed that the surgery was neither contraindicated nor medically inappropriate. Therefore, while the determination as to what is “appropriate care” is often fact and case-specific, a court should not decline to decide the issue on summary judgment where the facts are undisputed that the care in question is “appropriate.”

From A Smorgasbord of Interesting Disability Cases.

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Boly v. The Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 238 Ore. App. 702 (2010)

Facts and holding: In the late 1980s, Jeffrey Boly (“Boly”) was diagnosed with sleep apnea and narcolepsy. With treatment, doctors were able to stabilize Boly’s nighttime sleeping, but Boly’s daytime tiredness persisted and interfered with his ability to perform his job duties. As a result, Boly applied for and received partial disability benefits from his insurer, The Paul Revere Life Insurance Company (“Paul Revere”). 

Thereafter, Boly began to experience cognitive impairment. He was evaluated by a neuropsychologist who determined that Boly’s cognitive impairment likely resulted from chronic, nocturnal hypoxia (lack of oxygen to the brain) associated with sleep apnea that occurred prior to the diagnosis and treatment of Boly’s sleep apnea.

In 2006, the year before Boly’s 65th birthday, Boly requested that Paul Revere reclassify his disability as resulting from “injury” rather than from “sickness.” (Under the terms of Boly’s policy, disability benefits were available until age 65 if the disabling condition resulted from “sickness,” but for life if it resulted from “injury.”) The policy defined “injury” as “accidental bodily injury,” but did not define the term “accidental.” During its consideration of Boly’s request, Paul Revere had its doctors examine Boly’s medical records and, like Boly’s physicians, concluded that Boly’s cognitive impairment resulted from sleep apnea and narcolepsy. Based on this finding, Paul Revere denied Boly’s request and discontinued his benefits on his 65th birthday.

Boly brought suit against Paul Revere seeking reinstatement of his disability benefits and a declaration that he was entitled to lifetime benefits. Paul Revere moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Boly’s disability resulted from a sickness — sleep apnea. Boly argued that his brain injury was an accidental injury

because it was an unintended result of an external event – either his failure to breathe during episodes of sleep apnea or his physician’s failure to diagnose his sleep apnea.

The trial court granted Paul Revere’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Boly’s nocturnal hypoxia was the consequence of his sleep apnea (a sickness). The Court of Appeal affirmed. Since Boly’s policy did not provide a definition for “accidental bodily injury,” the meaning of the term depended on the “understanding of the ordinary purchaser of insurance.” Applying that standard, the Court rejected Boly’s argument that every unintentional result is accidental as long as it is caused by external events or forces. And the Court was right. Otherwise, every heart attack that could be traced to high cholesterol and every case of lung cancer that could be traced to smoking would also be considered “accidental injuries.”

The Court held that Boly’s failure to breathe and his undiagnosed sleep apnea where not “forces” or “events” in the same sense as lightening (as in being struck) or gravity (as in falling). The typical purchaser of insurance would regard Boly’s condition as analogous to organ failure or damage that resulted from disease. Such disabilities do not arise from “accidental bodily injury.” Therefore, Boly’s brain damage was not “accidental.” 

Lessons Learned: Boly’s position was that his hypoxia should be considered an “accidental bodily injury” because it was the unintended result of his sleep apnea. While an unintended result is one factor many courts consider in determining whether a disabling condition is an “accident,” the condition must also not be the result of a naturally occurring process, such as cancer, aging, medical disorders, etc. See, e.g., Khatchatrian v. Continental Casualty Co., 332 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. [Cal] 2003) (death from stroke not “accidental” because death was caused by natural, rather than external causes).

For a related case in which a heart attack at rest was considered not to be accidental, see Evans v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2572 (2008) (in which the author prevailed).

From A Smorgasbord of Interesting Disability Cases.

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