Sandra Weishart

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Sandra Weishart is a partner in the firm’s Los Angeles office, and has been with the firm since 1979. She is a trial attorney specializing in business litigation, with experience in all aspects of civil litigation, through trial and appeal stages.
A major focus of her practice involves life, health and disability insurance matters, including bad faith lawsuits, claims arising under California’s Unfair Competition Law and class actions. Additionally, Ms. Weishart speaks at professional conferences regarding insurance topics and is a member of the Insurance Law Advisory Board for Strafford Publications.
Ms. Weishart also handles professional liability and lender liability matters and has served as lead counsel in complex professional liability and lender liability cases and investigations for banking institutions and on behalf of the Federal Deposition Insurance Corporation.


Articles By This Author

United States Supreme Court Holds that Summary Plan Descriptions are Not Part of the Plan

In a significant loss for employees, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a pension plan's Summary Plan Description ("SPD") is not a part of the plan itself (CIGNA Corp. v. Amara). 

The decision, supported by all eight justices who participated, severely limits the ability of plan participants to sue for benefits based upon claimed irregularities in the SPD.

Until 1998, CIGNA's pension plan provided a retiring employee with an annuity based on pre-retirement salary and length of service. The new plan replaced the annuity with a cash balance based on a defined annual contribution from CIGNA, plus interest. The new plan translated earned benefits under the previous plan into an opening amount in the cash balance account. 

Plaintiffs, beneficiaries under CIGNA's pension plan (and the plan itself), acting on behalf of approximately 25,000 beneficiaries, challenged the new plan in a class action, claiming CIGNA failed to give them proper notice of the changes, particularly because the new plan provided less generous benefits. 

The District Court held that CIGNA's descriptions of the new plan were significantly incomplete and inaccurate and that CIGNA intentionally misled its plan participants, violating sections 102(a), 104(b) and 204(h) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended ("ERISA").  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022(a), 1024(a), 1054(h)

The District Court found that only class members who had suffered harm due to CIGNA's disclosure improprieties could obtain relief, but it did not require each class member to show individual injury. 

Instead, it found the evidence raised a presumption of "likely harm" suffered by class members and that, because CIGNA failed to rebut this presumption as to some or all participants, the evidence warranted class-applicable relief. 

Although section 204(h) of ERISA permits invalidation of plan amendments imposed without proper notice, the District Court did not do so here, reasoning that striking the new plan would further harm, rather than help, injured class members. 

Instead, granting relief under section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, which authorizes a civil action to recover "benefits due" under the terms of the plan, the District Court reformed the new plan, substituted a more generous retirement payment, and ordered CIGNA to pay benefits under the plan, as reformed.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 

The Supreme Court held that the lower court improperly relied upon section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, as that section does not authorize the District Court to change plan terms, rather than enforce existing terms. 

The Court rejected the argument that the District Court merely enforced existing terms of the plan because it enforced the SPD, which is part of the plan. 

In rejecting this theory, the Supreme Court reasoned that the SPD is not part of the plan, but merely information about the plan.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)

The Court commented that the argument ignores the distinction between the plan sponsor (which creates the plan and the procedures for making plan amendments) and the plan administrator (which manages the plan and provides the SPD in readily understandable form). 

The Court explained that, even where the duties of the plan sponsor and the plan administrator are performed by the same entity, the division of responsibilities between sponsor and administrator is significant. 

Imposing a rule that makes the SPD part of the plan and, therefore, allows statements in the SPD to modify the plan "might bring about complexity that would defeat the fundamental purpose of the summaries." 

While the Supreme Court did not find authority to reform plans under section 502(a)(1)(B), it nevertheless held that such authority exists under section 502(a)(3), which allows "other appropriate equitable relief" to redress violations of ERISA or plan terms.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). 

Accordingly, even though a legal remedy such as compensatory damages is not permitted, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court had the power to impose equitable remedies, including reformation of plan terms, injunctions to enforce plan terms, and orders to refrain from taking already accrued benefits (i.e., equitable estoppel).  

The Supreme Court noted ERISA does not establish a particular standard for determining harm, but requires the plan administrator to distribute written notice that is "'sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise'" participants of "'their rights and obligations'" under the plan (quoting § 102(a)).

Thus, the Court explained the requirement of harm must come from the law of equity. Moreover, to determine if "detrimental reliance" must be proved to obtain equitable relief, the lower court must look to the specific equitable remedy it seeks to impose.  

With respect to the action against CIGNA, the Supreme Court explained that, to obtain relief by surcharge for the claimed ERISA violations, a plan participant or beneficiary must show that the violation caused injury--i.e., harm and causation, but not necessarily detrimental reliance, and that the prejudice standard, if applicable, must be borrowed from equitable principles, as modified by the obligations and injuries identified by ERISA itself. 

The Supreme Court remanded the case, allowing the District Court to further evaluate the remedy it will impose in light of its opinion.   

Although this case arose in the context of alleged irregularities concerning pension benefits, the decision will apply with equal force to other forms of plan benefits, including SPDs concerning insurance benefits.

 

Insurer Has No Duty to Disclose Means of Obtaining Lower Premiums

In Levine v. Blue Shield of California, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, Division One, unanimously held that a health insurer has no duty to advise an applicant concerning how coverage could be structured to obtain lower monthly insurance premiums. 

The Levines filed the action, both individually and on behalf of a putative class, alleging causes of action for fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment and unfair competition under Business and Professions Code section 17200

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order sustaining Blue Shield's demurrer to the entire complaint, holding that Blue Shield had no duty to disclose the information that the Levines alleged was not provided during the application process.

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California Appellate Court Affirms Trial Court's Order Holding Putative UCL Class Should Not Be Certified

In a decision published October 26, 2009, a unanimous panel of the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order denying class certification in a case handled by Barger & Wolen, Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha et. al. Among other things, the court of appeal held that the California Supreme Court's recent decision in In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298 (2009) (“Tobacco II”) did not mandate reversal of the trial court's decision.

Kaldenbach's case arose from his purchase of an alleged “vanishing premium” life insurance policy. He claimed that, when he purchased an “Advantage Life” universal life insurance policy from Defendant Mutual of Omaha Life Insurance Company (“Mutual”), his agent represented that he would have to pay only four annual premiums, after which he would never have to pay another premium. Kaldenbach alleged those oral representations were false, as he later was required to pay more than four premiums to keep his policy in force. Seeking to transform his individual dispute into a class action, Kaldenbach also alleged that Mutual committed “class-wide” misrepresentations and omissions in scripted presentations and standardized marketing and training materials which, among other things, supposedly violated California’s Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (“UCL”).

In opposing class certification, Mutual showed that the class allegations involved thousands of individualized point-of-sale transactions between a policy owner and an agent — a scenario that courts consistently hold is not subject to class treatment. Mutual’s evidence demonstrated that Kaldenbach’s case, like those of the other putative class members, was based upon the unique dialogue between an agent and a policy owner, and that marketing materials, agent training and sales illustrations were not uniform. The trial court denied class certification, holding that Kaldenbach failed to meet any of the criteria required for class certification. Kaldenbach thereafter filed an appeal.

Prior to the hearing on Kaldenbach’s motion for class certification, Californians passed Proposition 64 (“Prop 64”), which limited standing under the UCL to a “person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of [such] unfair competition.” See Business and Professions Code § 17204. Additionally, Prop 64 mandated that UCL representative actions satisfy class action requirements under California Code of Civil Procedure section 382. At the time the trial court decided Kaldenbach’s class certification motion, Tobacco II — which raised the issue of whether, after Prop 64, each class member was now required to show an injury in fact, consisting of lost money or property, as a result of the alleged unfair competition — was pending before the California Supreme Court.

After Kaldenbach and Mutual completed their briefing and oral argument on appeal, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Tobacco II, holding that, to demonstrate standing to pursue a UCL claim as a class action, only the named plaintiff must show an injury in fact, consisting of lost money or property, as a result of the alleged unfair competition. Tobacco II, supra at 305-306, 324. The Supreme Court explained that the “standing requirements are applicable only to the class representatives, and not all absent class members.” Id. at 306. Significantly, the Supreme Court also concluded that “Proposition 64 was not intended to, and does not, impose section 17204’s standing requirements on absent class members in a UCL class action where class requirements have otherwise been found to exist.” ld. at 324.

In light of Tobacco II, the court of appeal in Kaldenbach requested further briefing on UCL class action issues. In one of the first appellate decisions to interpret Tobacco II, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, rejecting Kaldenbach’s argument that class certification was appropriate because reliance need not be proven on a class-wide basis under the UCL. The court of appeal reasoned that reliance was only one of the individualized issues noted by the trial court. Moreover, unlike Tobacco II, which involved identical misrepresentations and/or nondisclosures made to the entire class, in Kaldenbach’s case, no evidence linked alleged sales materials, training or illustrations to what was actually said or demonstrated in any sales presentation. Accordingly, the appellate court held that individualized issues predominated as to whether Mutual in fact committed an unfair business practice that was “likely to mislead” the putative class. 

Sandra Weishart and Misty Murray of Barger & Wolen are counsel for Mutual.
 

Second Circuit Holds Delayed Discovery Rule Applies to Unfair Competition Claims

Recently, in Broberg v. The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 171 Cal. App. 4th 912 (2009), the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District held that the "delayed discovery" rule, which applies to delay accrual of the statute of limitations for fraud causes of action until such time as the plaintiff discovers facts putting him on notice of the fraud, applies to unfair competition claims that are based upon alleged fraud. In so holding, the court added to the conflict in published decisions on the issue of whether the "delayed discovery" rule applies to unfair competition claims. See, e.g., Snapp & Associates Ins. Services, Inc. v. Robertson, 96 Cal. App. 4th 884, 891 (2002) (holding the "delayed discovery" rule does not apply to unfair competition claims).

In Broberg, David A. Powell purchased a $500,000 whole life insurance policy in 1993 from defendant The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America ("Guardian Life"). The Plaintiffs (Powell and the trustee of a related trust) alleged that Guardian Life's agent described the policy as so-called "vanishing premium" policy, i.e., one where, after a certain number of out-of-pocket premium payments were made, the policy itself would generate sufficient sums through its dividend and interest income to pay future premiums for the balance of his life. Claiming Guardian Life's marketing materials and its agent made false and misleading statements in 1993, when Powell purchased the policy, the plaintiffs alleged causes of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, unfair competition and false advertising under California's Unfair Practices Act (Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.) and violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA"), Civil Code section 1750 et seq.). The plaintiffs further alleged that Powell did not discover the deception until Guardian Life sent a bill for additional out-of-pocket premiums in 2004. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint, concluding disclosures in the policy and marketing materials were at least sufficient to give Powell inquiry, if not actual, notice of the alleged deception. The trial court determined the fraud, negligent misrepresentation and unfair competition causes of action accrued in 1993, when Powell purchased the policy and, therefore, those claims were time-barred under the three-year statute of limitations for fraud (see Code Civ. Proc.§ 338 (d)) and the four-year statute of limitations for unfair competition (see Bus.& Prof. Code § 17208). The trial court also concluded, based upon disclaimers in the documents, that the plaintiffs could not establish reliance as a matter of law. The trial court further determined that the CLRA claim was not viable, as the CLRA does not apply to insurance. (See Fairbanks v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 4th 56 (2009) (holding the CLRA does not apply to insurance). Finally, although the trial court ruled that the allegations did not justify an unfair competition cause of action based on the "vanishing premium" theory, they were sufficient to state a claim amounting to an unfair and unlawful sales tactic.


 

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